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Kierkegaard and Approximation Knowledge 
Thomas C. Anderson 
There seems to be general agreement that one of Kierkegaard's 
primary goals in writing the Postscript was to show the tremen-
dous limitations and fallibility of a human being's cognitive 
powers. In fact, many commentators claim that Kierkegaard is 
epistemologically a skeptic, and they cite especially the Postscript 
to support th~ir position (even though its author is the pseudony-
mous Johannes Climacus). For example, Mackey asserts that the 
very intent of the Postscript is to show that every belief and every 
truth claim about reality have no cognitive warrant. 1 Popkin also 
believes that skepticism is the final result of Kierkegaard' s episte-
mology; he writes, "When we search for true knowledge we end 
up in complete skepticism."2 Many others similarly claim that Kier-
kegaard holds that it is in principle impossible, at least without 
God's help, for humans to know if any particular explanation or 
interpretation of reality is true. Price succinctly sums up this inter-
pretation. He asks, "What then can I know?" and replies, "Noth-
ing, says K.ierkegaard, nothing with any degree of real certainty; 
nothing about God, nothing about the world as it really is."3 
t'L. Mackey, Kierkegaard, a Kind of Poet (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylva-
nia Press, 1971) 179-80; 189-92. , 
~- Popkin, "Kierkegaard and Skepticism," in Kierkegaard, A Collection of 
Critical Essays, ed. J. Thompson (Garden City NY: Doubleday, 1972) 368. 
3G. Price, The Narrow Pass (London: Hutchinson, 1963) 113. Others who 
advance this interpretation are K. Nordentoft, Kierkegaard's Psyclwlogy, trans. B: 
Kirrnrnse (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1978) 334-39; J. Gill, "Kant, 
Kierkegaard, and Religious Knowledge," in Essays on Kierkegaard (Minneapolis: 
Burgess Pub. Co., 1969) 66-67; A. Hannay, Kierkegaard: The Arguments of the Philos-
ophers (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982) 153. 
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On the other hand, most of the above authors do recognize that 
Kierkegaard admits the possibility of, and stresses the need for, 
self-knowledge. Yet, not all realize the full ramification this admJ.s-
sion has on his alleged skepticism. Furthermore, while granting 
that Kierkegaard believes that truths about one's self are obtain-
able, some limit such truths just to one's own individual reality4-a 
position that I will critique later. Of course, almost every interpret-
er agrees that Kierkegaard believes that an individual person aided 
by God's grace and revelation can attain a number of truths about 
reality, whether or not such truths can be fully comprehended. 
Various reasons have been offered in support of labeling Kier-
kegaard a skeptic. In this paper, however, I will address only one 
of them, namely, Climacus's repeated assertions in the Postscript 
that all empirical knowledge of reality is only "approximation." 
Some interpret this to mean that such knowledge can, at best, 
approach but never achieve truth about empirical reality.5 It will 
become clear in the course of this paper that I do not agree with 
that interpretation. 
In what follows, I will first set forth the views of Johannes 
Climacus on this issue and, then, seek to determine the extent to 
which Kierkegaard accepts Climacus's position. I will use the 
following criteria to determine which Postscript positions are in fact 
Kierkegaard's own. 
1. Any position stated both by Climacus and by Kierkegaard in 
works published under his own name will be considered to be 
Kierkegaard 's. 
2. Any position presented in those works published under the 
pseudonym Anti-Climacus (Sickness Unto Death and Practice in 
Christianity) will be considered Kierkegaard's. This is because 
this later pseudonym was used not because Kierkegaard dis-
agreed with, or dissociated himself from, the content of these 
4Price, The Narrow Pass, 113-21; Nordentoft, Kierkegaard's Psychology, 339-40; 
Hannay, Kierkegaard, 152-53; A. Shmueli, Kierkegaard and Consciousness, trans. N. 
Handelman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) 43-45. 
5For a discussion of other reasons why Kierkegaard is considered to be a 
skeptic, see my article "The Extent of Kierkegaard's Skepticism," Man and World 
27 (1994): 271-89. 
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works, but because he did not want to imply that he was living 
Christianity at the level of perfection presented in them.6 
3. Finally, passages in his Journals where I<ierkegaard clearly 
states his acceptance of a position of a pseudonymous author 
will be considered his own, as, of course, will entries which 
correspond to positions taken in the above mentioned works. 
Section I 
Empirical Knowledge as Approxim~tion 
Climacus's Position 
In the Postscript, Climacus offers a number of reasons for his 
apparent skepticism about empirical knowledge, or, more precise-
ly, for designating such knowledge as "approximation." Let us 
investigate his comments carefully to see just what he means by 
the use of that term. 
1. In the first place all empirical beings, including human 
knowers, are in the process of becoming. This means, Climacus 
writes, that "truth itself is in the process of becoming and is [only] 
by way of anticipation the agreement between thinking and being" 
(CUP, 1:190, translation modified). The point apparently is that 
truth, meaning the (fixed?) conformity or correspondence of 
thought and being is unattainable because of the continual change 
of both knower and known. Climacus refers to such truth as a 
desideratum, a goal which would be achieved only if becoming 
reached its end and ceased. The best we can obtain, he says, is 
"approximation" to this goal. 
2. A second reason Climacus offers for calling empirical 
knowledge "approximation" is a typical anti-foundationalist one. 
He points out that the "beginning [of empirical knowledge] cannot 
be established absolutely" by thought itself but is in a sense 
arbitrary. One reason it is arbitrary is because it is the knower who 
decides the "limits" of his or her investigation of any empirical 
data. Thus, for example, since all the members of a certain group 
cannot be studied, generalizations about the entire group rest on 
6JP 6:6433, 6446, 6461. See also the translators' introduction to SUD, xx-xxii. 
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the selection of a limited sample. Such generalizations are, 
therefore, inevitably approximations (CUP, 1:149-50). Furthermore, 
any existing human being's knowledge takes place from one of 
many limited perspectives or points of view. No individual can 
· attain an unlimited, absolute, God's eye view of reality. Now 
neither the selection of a particular perspective nor the selection of 
the data to be investigated are themselves guaranteed by a 
presuppositionless, indubitable, intellectually intuitive, self-evident 
foundation. The selections rest ultimately on will, that is, on free 
choice. I take it this is what Climacus means when he says "every 
beginning [of empirical knowledge] ... does not occur by virtue of 
immanental thinking but is made by virtue of a resolution, 
essentially by virtue of faith" (CUP, 1:189). 
3. A third reason why Climacus designates empirical knowl-
edge as only approximation is because its object, empirical being, 
is contingent. The Philosophical Fragments explains this in more 
detail than does Postscript. Accepting Leibniz's distinction between 
necessary truths of reason and contingent truths of fact, Climacus 
places all empirical knowledge in the latter category, arguing that 
such knowledge always lacks certitude or necessity, precisely 
because the beings it seeks to know lack necessity? 
In summary, since empirical reality is in constant change, since 
all empirical knowledge is perspectival and begins in choice, since 
empirical beings are thoroughly contingent, human knowledge of 
empirical reality is only approximation. Climacus himself states 
that conclusion, "objectively there is no truth for existing beings, 
but only approximations ... " (CUP, 1:218, 224). 
Yet in spite of such assertions, I am not convinced that 
Climacus, the detached humorist, personally agrees with all the 
positions he presents nor do I believe that the views that he sets 
forth are as thoroughly skeptical as many make them out to be. I 
say this for a number of reasons. In the first place, a thorough-
going skepticism about the truth of all knowledge of empirical 
reality would be incompatible with other positions Climacus 
clearly holds. Moreover, such a skepticism has internal difficulties 
that Climacus is well aware of. Finally, and this has been over-
7See the Interlude in PF, 72-88, and pp. 23, 30, and 81. 
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looked by man}" when Clirnacus labels empirical knowledge an 
approximation, he very often does not mean that such knowledge 
cannot achieve truth, but only that it cannot achieve intellectual 
certitude or necessity. Let me elaborate. 
For one thing, the claim that true knowledge of empirical 
reality is unobtainable involves internal difficulties common to all 
forms of skepticism, and Clirnacus is well aware of this. He 
recognizes, for example, that there is a "basic certainty" (CUP 
1:335ftn) contained within all skepticism. Specifically, to argue that, 
because both the knower and the object of knowledge are chang-
ing, no true empirical knowledge is possible, presupposes that we 
do in fact possess true knowledge of empirical beings, at least in 
general, namely, that they are concrete, particular things that 
change. Speaking of change, if one defines empirical truth, and 
Climacus does, as the conformity or agreement of thought with 
being, then, unless one considers reality to be a radical Heraclition 
flux, and Climacus clearly does not, the mere fact that things 
change, and are contingent, does not preclude true knowledge of 
them in their relatively stable features. Climacus surely understands 
this for he expresses his agreement with Aristotle on this point 
(CUP, 1:312-13). He does, after all, give the empirical statement 
"the earth is round" as an example of an objective truth (CUP, 
1:194-95)-and one could think of countless other statements about 
empirical reality which he would accept as true (e.g., Copenhagen 
is in Denmark). In fact, as we shall see in the next section, he 
claims to have a great deal of true knowledge about one kind of 
changing, contingent being, the human self. 
Furthermore, if Climacus actually believes that empirical 
knowledge cannot attain truth, this would render unintelligible his 
statements that such knowledge consists of approximations. If 
empirical reality is unable to be truly known, it would be impossi-
ble to know whether any attempted explanation of it was close to 
the truth or not, nor would one have any objective basis for 
choosing among differing explanations. Yet Climacus never 
suggests that he believes that every interpretation of reality is 
equally arbitrary or has an equal claim to truth. Need I point out 
that he obviously considers his own explanation of the general 
character of empirical reality, and of the human self, to be, if not 
absolutely true, more true than those offered by idealism, romanti-
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cism, rationalism, paganism, or Christendom. This has to mean 
that he is not totally skeptical about the human ability to grasp 
some truths about empirical beings. 
In fact, much of the skepticism about empirical knowledge 
· which is found in the Postscript rests upon a very rationalistic 
and/or idealistic understanding of the nature of truth.8 This be-
comes dear when one notes that the term approximation is often 
used, not to mean approximation to truth, but approximation to 
certitude about an eternal, finished, absolute system of knowledge. 
In this light, let us look at each of the three reasons set forth above 
which he gives for challenging the truth of empirical knowledge. 
1. In spite of the fact that in the Postscript he defines empirical 
truth as the conformity of thought and being, a definition which, 
as I indicated, does not of itself preclude true knowledge of 
changing beings, immediately after giving that definition Climacus 
proceeds to limit such truth or conformity to the realm of the 
totally eternal and unchanging. Speaking like an idealist who iden-
tifies truth only with the completed, and, therefore, unchanging, 
system, he states that in the empirical realm truth is a goal which 
can only be approximated or anticipated because "the empirical 
object is not finished" and the knower is coming to be (CUP, 1:189-
90). In other words, empirical knowledge is called approximation 
in comparison to an eternal finished (idealist) system. Note, how-
ever, this does not mean that such knowledge cannot be in 
conformity with presently _existing empirical beings, and, therefore, 
true in that sense. 
2. Climacus's statements about the arbitrary character of the be-
ginnings of empirical knowledge also have a rationalistic/ idealistic 
ring to them. On the one hand, some statements seem to assume, 
with idealism, that truth lies only in the whole, in an absolute and 
total grasp of reality. Otherwise, the mere fact that human knowl-
edge is always from finite perspectives would not of itself mean 
that it is an approximation. All that necessarily follows from the 
perspectival character of human knowledge is that no individual 
&rhus, I agree with Robert Perkins that it is Hegelian ideali.sm and not 
empirical realism that Kierkegaard is against in CUP. See his "Kierkegaard's 
Epistemological Preferences," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (1973): 
198-200, 214. 
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can reach an absolute, unlimited, point of view from which to 
grasp the truth about the whole of reality. The fact that human 
knowledge is perspectival does not of itself mean that an individu-
al cannot grasp any truth about reality, nor that his or her grasp 
of reality is illusory or inaccurate, nor that he or she colors or 
structures or creates the features of that which he or she knows. 
Climacus himself draws none of these conclusions from the per-
spectival character of human knowledge. On the contrary he states 
that "all knowledge and all apprehension has nothing to give from 
itself" to the object known (PF, 80, translation modified). Moreover, 
the fact that knowledge is perspectival does not of itself preclude 
the possibility of one perspective allowing a more complete or 
deeper grasp of the real than another, a position Climacus certainly 
holds about his own views. To repeat, only if truth is identified 
with a nonlimited (hence nonperspectival) absolute realm of 
knowledge can human knowledge be considered to be just an 
approximation because it involves a limited point of view. 
I might add that the fact that empirical knowledge does not 
begin with presuppositionless, indubitable, intuitively self-evident 
principles also does not render it unable to truly grasp reality-un-
less one assumes with classical rationalism that only necessary 
truths, those whose opposite is impossible, can furnish a proper 
foundation for knowledge. True knowledge is simply that which 
corresponds to reality, as Climacus himself recognizes; no more, no 
less. 
3. Finally, to call empirical knowledge an approximation be-
cause generalizations about empirical data are in principle falsifi-
able by new data does not mean that empirical knowledge cannot 
be true but only that it cannot be absolutely certain or necessary. 
Of course,the more data that supports an inductive generalization, 
the more it approaches or approximates certitude. But not a ll em-
pirical knowledge involves induction from incomplete data, and 
even generalizations that do may in fact be true, that is, be in con-
formity with reality, even though they are in principle falsifiable. 
To repeat, Climacus's use of the term approximation here means1 
not approximation to truth (whatever that could mean), bu~ J 
approximation to certitude. Similarly, for Climacus to designate all 
empirical knowledge as approximate because its object is contin-
gent or nonnecessary, is to say, as he does, that empirical knowl-
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edge is not certain in the sense of logically necessary. The opposite 
of any statement about empirical reality is logically possible. This 
is not, however, to say that empirical knowledge cannot be tr~e, 
that is,. be in agreement with reality. Thus, when Climacus states 
that all historical knowledge, and in fact all knowledge of contin-
gent beings, is only "approximation knowledge," he is claiming 
that the best it can do is approach, but never become, certain 
knowledge, necessary knowledge, that whose opposite is impossi-
ble. He is not saying, however, that such knowledge can never be 
in conformity with reality.9 
Thus, we see that the skepticism about empirical knowledge set 
forth by Climacus, specifically his claim that all such knowledge 
is only approximation, is not nearly as radical as some believe. It 
rests on a highly rationalistic/idealistic conception of true knowl-
edge, one which identifies true with necessary, logically certain, 
absolute, eternal, complete.10 Given such a conception, to say that 
knowledge of empirical reality is approximate simply means it is 
never necessary, logically certain, absolute, eternal, or complete. 
Whether Kierkegaard actually intends to portray Climacus as one 
who himself accepts this grand idealistic conception of truth, or 
whether, as I suspect, he uses his pseudonym to show his rational-
istic/idealistic contemporaries that their conception of truth 
renders it unattainable for existing subjects, is not clear to me. In 
- any case, the fact remains that if the author of the Postscript simply 
sticks with the classical d~finition of truth as the correspondence 
of thought with reality, a definition he himself offers, there is no 
need for him to deny that humans can achieve true knowledge of 
empirical beings. Indeed, Climacus does assert that knowledge, 
even certain knowledge, is possible of at least one empirical being, 
namely, one's self. That assertion buttresses my interpretation of 
9-fn my optmon the Interlude of PF makes it dear that knowledge of 
contingencies is uncertain, but not necessarily untrue. Likewise see CUP, 1:23-24, 
30, 81, 152-53. 
1
'Perkins, "Kierkegaard's Epistemological Preferences," makes a helpful 
distinction between the Hegelian idealism which Kierkegaard (or Climacus) 
opposes and a Socratic humanistic idealism which he accepts. For the source of 
truth in the latter see nn. 21-24 below. 
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his statements about empirical knowledge as approximation and 
I will pursue this point in section II. 
Let us turn now to Kierkegaard and attempt to determine what 
he himself holds about the truth claims of empirical knowledge. 
Kierkegaard's Position 
In works published under his own name or that of Anti-Clima-
cus, .Kierkegaard's main concerns are religious. Only infrequently 
does he utter statements directly pertaining to .epistemology, and 
even then the context is not philosophical but theological. Al-
though they often discuss the relation between faith and knowl-
edge, these works, unlike Climacus', set forth no general theory of 
knowledge. Thus, it is not possible to determine whether every 
single conclusion or argument presented by Climacus is accepted 
by .Kierkegaard; all we can do is attempt to discover whether the 
basic position or positions of the Postscript about empirical knowl-
edge are .Kierkegaard's own. 
I find little or no indication that .Kierkegaard himself is 
skeptical about the human ability to attain true knowledge of 
empirical reality. For one thingJ he certainly expresses his disagree-
ment with the rationalistic/idealistic definitions of truth (as 
necessary, logically certain, absoluteJ e ternal, complete) which was 
the foil of Climacus's remarks about empirical knowledge as 
approximation. Furthermore, in his religious writings, when he 
does speak of human knowledge of empirical reality, such as 
history or natural science, Kierkegaard does not say that such 
knowledge cannot attain truth; in fact, he is sometimes willing to 
grant that it can. 11 The question that concerns him is, rather, even-
if history or natural science possesses true knowledge, is this truth 
important·or relevant to an understanding of spirit and to the sub-
jective task of becoming Christian? H e usually concludes that it is 
not, and it may even be "dangerous" for it may "distract" one 
11At PC, 27, for example, Kierkegaard speaks of history "proving" particular 
truths. Also, in CD he states that objective thought can be "true and profound" 
(CD, 207). 
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from his or her ethical task, the task of being spirit.12 In one 
passage he puts it this way: 
The main objection, the whole objection, to the natural sciences · 
can be expressed formally, simply, and unconditionally in this 
way: It is incredible that a human being who has infinitely re-
flected about himself as spirit could then think of choosing the 
natural sciences (with empirical material) as the task for his 
striving. (JP, 3:2820) 
Indeed, natural science "becomes especially dangerous and corrup-
tive when it wants to enter into the realm of the spirit" (JP 3:2809), 
for it can only deal with the physical. It is also worth mentioning 
that Climacus's favorite word, approximation, almost never occurs 
in works Kierkegaard wrote under his own name or the pseudo-
nym Anti-Climacus, and when it does it is almost exclusively used 
in an ethicoreligious, not an epistemological, context. 13 There are 
a few Journal entries, and they probably express Kierkegaard's own 
view, which refer to the fallibility of human knowledge of 
empirical reality since inductive generalizations are "merely 
statistical" (JP 1:1072) and "an approximation process" (JP 3:2809); 
However, as I argued above, the most one could infer from such 
statements is that empirical knowledge is not certain or necessary; 
they do not assert that such knowledge cannot be true. 
It is the case that Kierkegaard, like Climacus, stresses the per-
spectival character of human knowledge. In an early Upbuilding 
Discourse, for example, he writes, "what one sees depends on how 
one sees ... how the observer himself is constituted is indeed 
decisive" (EUD, 59). In later works, he repeatedly contrasts the 
radically different interpretations the so-called na tural man and the 
Christian have of things like guilt, suffering, love, natural inclina-
tions, even of Christianity itself. He emphasizes that ultimately 
12PC, 31; EUD, 134-35. For Kierkegaard's comments on natural science see JP, 
3:2809-24. 
13Except for JFY, 208-209, the word approximation does not even appear in the 
various indexes compiled by Hong and Lowrie to works Kierkegaard published 
under his own name or as Anti-Ciimacus. In Journal entries such as 2:2809, 2813, 
and 4:4267, where he refers to natural science as approximation, the term seems 
to mean that such science can attain no real knowledge about spirit or the ethical 
and religious. Hence it is "qualitatively irrelevant" OP 3:2809). 
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each individual must freely choose (with God's grace) to accept or 
not accept the Christian perspective. In the same vein, Works of 
Love states that "every event, every word, every act, in short,-
everything can be explained in many ways," and adds that varia-
tions in explanation are possible because of free choice (WL, 291). 
For example, one can choose to love another and then his or her 
explanation of the other's behavior will be significantly different 
from that offered from the viewpoint of a nonlover. Such state-
ments by Kierkegaard indkate that Climacus's v·iew is his, namely, 
human knowledge does not ultimately rest on indubitable, in-
tellectually intuited, self-evident principles, but on freely chosen 
starting points, based on light-hearted or serious intent. According-
ly, Kierkegaard's own position appears to be: "That by which a be-
ginning [of "science and scholarship"] is made is a resolution" (JP, 
2:2292). 
Still, as I explained above, there is no contradiction in holding 
that human knowledge is perspectival and rooted in freely chosen 
starting points, and at the same time claiming that it can be in con-
formity with reality, that is, true. I will not repeat my arguments 
but simply remark that Kierkegaard himself expresses little doubt 
about the truth of his explanations of reality nor about their superi-
ority, and the superiority of his perspective, over rival ones. 
Thus, as far as empirical knowledge is concerned, I am ex-
tremely reluctant to attribute the alleged skepticism of the Post-
script, that humans cannot attain truth about empirical reality, to 
Kierkegaard himself. As I indicated above, I have serious doubts 
that it should even be attributed to Climacus once one understands 
that his statements about empirical knowledge as approximation 
are directed against rationalistic/idealistic conceptions of truth. Of 
course, one cannot prove the negative, but at least I can argue that 
in the absence of any dear evidence in his own writings that he 
believes that empirical knowledge is unable to attain truth, it 
seems gratuitous to saddle Kierkegaard with such a skepticism, es-
pecially if one considers the implicit realism behind all his thought. 
Let me conclude this section on this point, for it seems clear 
that Kierkegaard and Climacus do both implicitly accept the basic 
views of classical realism. Granted, realism as an epistemological 
theory is never explicitly defended in detail by either of them, yet 
is it not obvious in every one of his works that Kierkegaard and 
I . 
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all his pseudonymous authors acknowledge the existence of 
particular beings independent of the knower, and believe that 
these beings can be known to some degree?14 One can also point 
to Kierkegaard's and Climacus's r:epudiation of Hegelian Idealism 
or pure thought precisely because it identifies reality with that 
which is only in the realm of thought. Kierkegaard's and Clima-
cus's complaint that such identification leaves out actual reality, 
namely, concrete individual temporal beings, is further confirma-
tion of their realism. Moreover, in the Postscript itself, while 
admitting that Kant's skepticism about the ability of thought to 
know reality cannot be overcome by thought itself, since that very 
power is called into question, the author nevertheless categorically 
rejects such skepticism. What one must do with it, he says, is just 
"break" with it, and dismiss as a "temptation" any question about 
the reality of a thing-in-itself eluding thought. Such questions, he 
states, arise only when thought becomes too self-reflexive and 
selfishly seeks to think itself (its own content), thereby refusing to 
do its job of thinking other things.15 
Since I cannot imagine that anyone would seriously deny that 
Kierkegaard and his pseudonymous author implicitly, at least, 
adopt this basic position of epistemological realism, I will dwell on 
this no further but tum instead to the most clear case where 
Climacus and Kierkegaard do allow true and certain knowledge of 
one kind of empirical reality, namely, knowledge of the human 
self. As we shall see, the extent of such knowledge is much wider 
than is realized by many who label Kierkegaard and Climacus 
skeptics. 
141n other wo.rds, I agree with Mackey that the basic assumptions of classical 
realism are in the background of Kierkegaard's writings as "beliefs-which-it-is.-
not-necessary-to-call-into-question," 270, of "The Loss of the World in Kierke-
gaard's Ethics," in Kierkegaard, ed. Thompson. If I understand him corredly, 
Robert Perkins also considers Kierkegaard to hold an empirical, realist metaphys-
ics and epistemology, in "Always Himself: A Survey of Recent Kierkegaard 
Literature," Southern Journal of Philosophy (Winter 1974): 543.ln Passionate Reason 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992) 138, C. S. Evans says Kierkegaard 
is a realist like Plato and Aristotle. 
1SCUP, 1:328, 335. 
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Section II 
Knawledge of the Self 
Climacus's Position 
199 
One of the major themes of part two, section ll of the Postscript 
is that every individual should be a subjective thinker not a 
detached objective one. That means, Climacus s~ys, that "in all his 
thinking [the individual] has to include the thought that he himself 
is an existing person" (CUP, 1:351). The subjective thinker should 
continually strive to understand himself; indeed, such self-knowl-
edge is the only certain knowledge an individual can attain. In his 
exposition, Climacus, in fact, sets forth quite a large number of 
items that each individual can and should come to know about the 
self.16 (1) A person can understand that the greatest ethical task he 
or she has is to become a self or subject in the fullest sense; (2) A 
person can come to see that this demands passionate interest in 
one's self and repeated free decisions to (3) appropriate or live 
what he or she knows from self-reflection he or she should be, and 
this involves ( 4) knowing and unifying into a concrete harmony his 
or her human faculties of imagination, feeling, passion, and 
thought. 17 More generally, a person can understand that becoming 
a self means (5) "to become a whole human being" (CUP, 1:346), 
that is, to express in his or her individual existence " the essentially 
human" (CUP 1:356). The latter statements presuppose, of course, 
that one knows, or can know, what is essentially human. This -
point is extremely important for it shows that Climacus believes 
that subjective reflection gives one not just an understanding of his 
or her unique individual self but also knowledge of the general 
nature or essence of the human self. This should not surprise us 
since the statements about the human self which Climacus makes 
throughout the Postscript are set forth not just as descriptions of 
one individual self, Johannes Clirnacus, but as true and applicable 
to every human self as such. 
1
"See the whole discussion in CUP, 1, part II, sec. ll, chap. I, "Becoming 
Subjective." 
17CUP, 1, part II, sec. II, chap. Ill, @4. 
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However, some who consider him a skeptic about the powers 
of human understanding claim that Climacus believes that true 
knowledge of the self can be gained only through Divine Rev~la­
tion.18 1t is true that Climacus states that from the Christian point 
of view non-Christians are wrong in thinking that they have 
within themselves the power to grasp the truth about themselves, 
for the non-Christian does not realize how radically human beings 
are gripped by sin and how sin renders them unable to understand 
themselves. Since the remedy for sin can only be supplied by God, 
only God can furnish the condition which enables us to grasp 
truth.19 Now Climacus does say all this, yet he also presents 
Socrates, the personification of philosophy, as able to know many 
things about the self.20 He also states that many such truths are 
grasped in religion A, the religion of immanence, which is the 
religion which "has only universal human nature as its presupposi-
tion" (CUP, 1:559) and "can be present in paganism" (CUP, 1:557). 
True knowledge about the self is explicitly said to be attained by 
the self's reflection on itself, a kind of Platonic "recollection" (PF, 
87)/1 and it is sharply distinguished from the revealed truths of 
Christianity (for example, original sin, forgiveness, Christ, the God-
man, etc.) which "did not arise in any human heart" (PF, 109). It 
seems evident, then, that Climacus believes that a great deal of 
knowledge about the self can be attained by a human being. 
t Let me explicitly draw out the implications of all this on my 
earlier interpretation of Climacus's alleged skepticism about 
empirical knowledge, specifically his designation of it as approxi-
mation. As we saw above, a close reading of the texts showed that 
Climacus so labels it for three reasons: {1} all empirical objects 
change; (2) all such knowledge is perspectival and rests on choice 
not on intuitively self-evident principles; and (3) empirical beings 
1SSee the authors cited in nn. 3 and 4 above. 
1
'1'F, 13, 51, 62-65. 
211CUP, 1:204-206; PF, 11-13, 20, 31, 87. 
21For Climacus's discussion of religion A and its source of knowledge see 
CUP, 1:204-13, 555-61. See also the texts cited in the previous footnote. On this 
point l agree with L. Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity (University AL: University 
of Alabama Press, 1984) chap. 3, and C. S. Evans, Kierkegaard's Fragments and 
Postscript (Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities Press, 1983) chap. 8. 
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are contingent. But to say this is to say that such knowledge is 
never necessary, logically certain, absolute, eternal or complete; 
that is, it is not true in a rationalistic/idealistic sense. It is not to 
say that empirical knowledge cannot be true, meaning be in 
conformity with reality. The fact that Climacus holds that humans 
can have true knowledge of the self verifies this. After all, the self 
changes continually and is contingent. Knowledge of it is not 
based on necessary self-evident first principles and it is surely per-
spectival (e.g., a self can be grasped from an aesthetic or an ethical 
or a religious perspective). Since Climacus asserts that knowledge 
of the self can be certain, that must mean that designating empiri-
cal knowledge as approximation is not to be taken as skeptical 
about the possibility of true knowledge of (at least one) empirical 
reality. What, then, about Kierkegaard? 
Kierkegaard' s Position 
Anyone acquainted with Kierkegaard's religious writings 
knows that throughout them he stresses the need for each individ-
ual to achieve an understanding of him or herself if he or she is to 
become a true Christian. Like Climacus, he repeatedly contrasts 
impersonal objective knowledge with knowledge that concentrates 
on the self and insists on the need for the latter. In Judge For Your-
self, for example, he distinguishes between a type of knowledge or 
understanding that simply knows, and one that understands one's 
self inwardly and in the direction of concrete action.22 Also, like 
Climacus, Kierkegaard believes that reflection on one's self yields 
not just an understanding of one's unique individual self, but an 
understanding of the essential nature of the self. This is evident if 
one notes that in his religious writings Kierkegaard is not simply 
engaged in· his personal autobiography when he stresses the need 
for self-reflection and self-understanding. He continually makes 
general statements about the nature of the self and its path (the 
stages) to faith, statements obviously meant to apply to all selves. 
Furthermore, again like Climacus, Kierkegaard holds that some 
knowledge of the self is attainable by human understanding; it 
need not come only through Divine Revelation. The Sickness unto 
22}FY, 35-45. Also see CD, 154-55, 207-208, and PC, 48-49, 205-206, 233-34. 
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Death makes this clear for in it, as he sets forth the human 
progression in self-knowledge, he indicates that some (partial) 
knowledge of the self is possible this side of Christian revelation. 
For example, he describes individuals who, though not believers, 
are somewhat "conscious of being despair and therefore conscious 
... of having a self in which there is something eternal" (SUD, 47). 
Now to say that one is aware of having a self with something 
eternal is to say that he or she is aware, to a some degree, of the 
nature of that self. Furthermore, Kierkegaard describes and ranks 
various types of despair in terms of their increased insight into the 
nature of the self as spirit, and many of these forms of despair are 
explicitly said to be present in non-Christians.23 Thus, at the end of 
his descriptions he states that these "gradation[s] in the conscious-
ness of the self," are "within the category of the human self, or the 
self whose criterion is man" (SUD, 79). 
Accordingly, whether or not they agree on every detail, it is 
clear that Kierkegaard holds Climacus's position that we can, in 
spite of our radical sinfulness, arrive at a number of truths about 
the nature of the self by our own powers. A number of Journal 
entries make it plausible to assume that, like Climacus, he believes 
that knowledge of the self's nature is available by recollection, that 
is, by reflection on the mind's inner content. In one he states that 
Plato's view that "all knowledge is recollection" is "beautiful," 
"profound," and "sound," and that" All philosophizing is a self-
reflection of what already is given in consciousness" (JP, 2:2274).24 
- Of course, Kierkegaard believes that ultimately only the Christian 
message brings the fullness of truth, as well as the power to accept 
it. Yet this hardly means that what the non-Christian knows about 
the self is completely false or unimportant. It seems necessary, 
then, to draw the same conclusion that we did in Climacus's case. 
Kierkegaard is not thoroughly skeptical about the possibility of 
human knowledge of empirical beings, at least not when it comes 
to knowledge of the human self.25 We can be even stronger. Not 
llSUD, 29-31, 47-74. 
24Also see, JP, 1:649; 3:3085 and 3606. 
lSJ'he possibility of human knowledge of empirical beings other than the self 
has special difficulties of its own which I have treated at length in "The extent of 
Kierkegaard's skepticism." 
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only is such knowledge possible, it is absolutely necessary for an 
individual to attain some understanding of his or her self, 
especially of his/her freedom and limitations, his/her obligation 
to be a self, his/her need for the eternal, his/her weakness and 
guilt, prior to any revelation. For only if one gains such knowledge 
will they ever become receptive to God's revelation of their sins 
and Christ's atonement and forgiveness. 
However, to insist on the necessity of such knowledge of the 
self raises problems of its own if one takes seriously the Postscript's 
strong statements about the inverse relation between objective 
truth (including, presumably, objective truths about the nature of 
the self) and subjective truth (i.e., the subjective appropriation of 
truths). But that is an issue for another paper. 
